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Articles 
FOR THE RESPONDENT 
Byron L. Warnken, Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
In Mary/and v. Wilson,l the Supreme Court of 
the United States held, by a vote of 7 to 2, that the 
Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures permits law enforcement officers, under a 
"bright-line" rule, to remove all passengers from all 
validly stopped vehicles. This article addresses my 
involvement, and that of many others within the 
University of Baltimore School of Law community, 
in the Wilson case at the Supreme Court level. 
On December 11, 1996, I argued Respondent 
Wilson's case before the Supreme Court. For thirty 
glorious minutes, I was afforded the opportunity that 
most attorneys only dream about: to engage in 
vigorous dialogue with the justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In retrospect, at least 
three ingredients came together to allow me to be 
the one who stood before the Supreme Court: (1) 
academic credentials in Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure, (2) academic and practical credentials 
in appellate advocacy, and (3) luck. 
Wilson in the Maryland Court System 
On August 3D, 1995, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland filed a publish.ed opinion in 
Mary/and v. Wi/son,2 authored for an unanimous 
court by the Honorable Charles E. Moylan, Jr. I 
immediately made note of the opinion for three 
reasons. First, Judge Moylan and Professor Wayne 
LaFave of the University of Illinois are considered 
the two leading experts in the nation on Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure. Second, the 
opinion may be the best teaching tool I've ever 
seen for explaining the difference between 
holding/rationale and mere dicta. Third, the opinion 
clearly articulated the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence leading up to, and applicable in, the 
instant case. 
The State of Maryland, as the non-prevailing 
party, then filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. After the court of 
1 117 s. ct. 882 (1997). 
2106 Md. App. 24, 664 A.2d 1 (1995). 
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appeals denied certiorari,3 the State then filed a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Twenty-seven other states 
joined in an amicus petition filed in support of 
Maryland. Subsequently, the Court "conferenced" 
the case and requested a Brief in Opposition to be 
filed no later than May 3, 1996. 
Shortly thereafter, I learned that defendant 
Jerry Lee Wilson had not been represented by 
counsel since the court of special appeals level, 
meaning that he did not have an attorney in either 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland or the Supreme 
Court of the United States. On April 11, I confirmed 
this with his prior counsel, who encouraged me to 
become involved in the appeal. At that point, I tried 
unsuccessfully to make contact with Mr. Wilson and 
to offer my services on a pro bono basis. Mr. 
Wilson was not in Maryland and I was unable to 
make contact at that time. 
Wilson in the Supreme Court 
On April 12, I called the Supreme Court and 
explained the situation to Francis J. Lorson, 
Esquire, Chief Deputy Clerk. It was apparent that 
the Court wanted to appoint counsel for Mr. Wilson. 
My dilemma was that I was willing to represent Mr. 
Wilson, but I had not yet been able to obtain Mr. 
Wilson's authorization. This situation seemed to 
present no problem for the Court, which authorized 
me to commence work on the Brief in Opposition, 
with the assurance that I would be appointed 
"counsel of record."4 
I had been involved in cases before the 
Supreme Court in the past, but never as counsel of 
record. In 1990, in Mary/and v. Craig,S I had served 
as lead counsel on the Respondent's Brief. At that 
time, I became a member of the Supreme Court 
Bar, .and I had the privilege of sitting at counsel 
table during the oral argument. As part of my 
service component on the law faculty, I serve as the 
Legal Program Director of the National Law 
3340 Md. 502, 667 A.2d 342 (1995). 
• On October 7, 1996, the Court issued an order appointing me 
·counsel of record: 
5497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
Enforcement Officers' Rights Center.6 In that 
capacity, in 1995, I assisted on the amicus brief, 
filed on behalf of the Petitioners, by the National 
Association of Police Organizations, in Koon & 
Powell v. United States,7 which is better known as 
the Rodney King case. 
I expressed to the Chief Deputy Clerk of the 
Supreme Court my grave concern that I would not 
be able to properly prepare the Brief in Opposition 
in only twenty-one days. I assumed that I had 
some leverage because, by offering to provide 
representation for Mr. Wilson, I was, in a real 
sense, doing the Court a favor. I was told that I 
could "probably" obtain a ten-day extension, until 
May 13, which would give me a total of thirty-one 
days. On April 15, I obtained a copy of the 
petitions filed by the State and the amicus. I wrote 
a letter to the Supreme Court, begging for an 
additional two weeks or, in the alternative, at least 
one week. The Court ultimately granted a total 
extension of seventeen days, meaning that I had 
five weeks from the date I received the petitions 
until the date I had to file the Brief in Opposition. 
The Supreme Court receives more than 6,000 
certiorari petitions annually, yet it heard oral 
argument in only eighty-five cases last year. Thus, 
nearly 99% of the petitions for a writ of certiorari are 
summarily disposed of with a one line order saying 
"cert. denied." Nonetheless, based on the Court's 
having "conferenced"the petitions in Wilson, plus 
the Court's request for a written Brief in Opposition, 
I believed that the Court had already decided to 
grant certiorari or, at a minimum, was leaning 
strongly in that direction, even before I contacted 
the Court. 
The Brief in Opposition 
I had thirty-five days to accomplish what I 
have always described to my students as an 
attorney's most difficult task. An attorney is on the 
prevailing side of a case, before either a federal 
circuit court or a state court of last resort, and then 
the losing side petitions the Supreme Court to take 
the case. The zealous advocate wants to -- and 
6 The National Law Enforcement Officers' Rights Center is the 
advocacy and education branch of the Police Research and Education 
Project (PREP), which is a component of the National Association of 
Police Organizations, Inc., representing approximately 200,000 law 
enforcement officers nationally. 
7518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
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must -- take every legal and ethical step to ensure 
that the Supreme Court does not take the case. At 
the same time, the human being in any attorney 
would certainly relish the once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to argue before the nine justices of the 
highest court in the land. I was determined that if 
certiorari were granted, I could look in the mirror 
every morning knowing that I had left no stone 
unturned in my effort to have certiorari denied. 
The issue presented to the Court by the State 
was as follows: "When a police officer makes a 
lawful traffic stop, does the officer's automatic right 
to order the driver to exit the vehicle, pursuant to 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), 
extend to passengers in the stopped vehicle?" My 
task was to convince the Supreme Court that this 
question was not important enough to need an 
answer. Thus, the Brief in Opposition to the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is not a brief on the 
merits of the case. The key to precluding certiorari 
from being granted is not to convince the Supreme 
Court that your side is the winning side, but to 
convince the Supreme Court that American 
jurisprudence does not need the Supreme Court to 
answer the question presented to it. My strategy 
and approach were five-fold. 
First, I planned to demonstrate that the 
analysis set forth by Judge Moylan was absolutely 
correct. Second, it was my strong surmise that, 
during the nearly two decades since the Court's 
decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, only 
infrequently had appellate courts even been 
presented with the issue of the applicability of 
Mimms to passengers. If I could demonstrate that 
only rarely did any court need to know the answer 
to the question posed by the State, perhaps I could 
convince the Court that this was not a "cert. worthy" 
issue. Third, it was my hope to demonstrate that 
there was no significant split among those 
jurisdictions that had addressed this issue. Fourth, 
it was my hope that there was only minimal 
evidence that harm to law enforcement officers 
during traffic stops was inflicted at the hands of 
passengers, as opposed to drivers. Fifth, because 
the State was urging the Court to adopt a "bright-
line" rule, it was my hope to persuade the Court that 
such a rule was inapplicable when considering the 
vast array of passenger situations. Of course, at 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 5 
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that point, I did not know with certainty where the 
research would take me. 
The legal research on the second of the five 
points mentioned above would require examining 
every case addressing a Fourth Amendment issue, 
in the context of an automobile, during a two-
decade period. I assumed that almost all of those 
intrusions would be controlled by existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, e.g: (1) a valid warrant 
or warrantless arrest of one or more of the 
occupants of a vehicle, followed by a valid search of 
the interior of the vehicle, pursuant to the search 
incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement; (2) a valid vehicle search, pursuant to 
a valid search warrant or a valid automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement; a valid 
vehicle stop, followed by a valid vehicle search, 
based on reasonable suspicion that one or more of 
the occupants was presently armed and dangerous; 
or (3) a valid consent search. Every one of these 
situations, as well as others, would permit law 
enforcement officers to remove the passengers 
from the vehicle, yet would not require application 
of Pennsylvania v. Mimms. Thus, the issue 
presented in Wilson would only present itself in 
those situations in which (1) a vehicle was validly 
stopped for a traffic violation, (2) there was no 
evidence of administrative or criminal wrongdoing 
on the part of the passenger, and (3) there was 
nothing that posed a threat to officer safety, yet (4) 
the officer required the passenger to exit the 
vehicle. 
University of Baltimore Law Student 
Volunteers 
If each federal and state jurisdiction had only 
one reported post-Mimms vehicle case per month, 
there would be close to 23,000 opinions to review. 
At two cases per month, there would be more than 
45,000 opinions. At four cases per month, the 
number of opinions would exceed 90,000. Just the 
first step -- locating and reviewing these opinions --
would be an impossible task for one person, who 
would then also have the ultimate assignment of 
preparing and filing a timely Brief in Opposition. 
At that time, it was two weeks before the start 
of the spring semester law school final exams. My 
timing could not be worse. Nonetheless, I posted a 
sign at the Law School, seeking research 
assistance and promising, in return, an interesting 
28.1. U. Bait. L. F. 6 
experience, a one-line resume entry, and a ticket to 
the oral argument if I could obtain one. I assumed 
that, with law school exams just two weekends 
away, I would be lucky to get five or six student 
volunteers and, as such, there should be no trouble 
obtaining that many seats for the oral argument. 
What a wonderful surprise for me when fifty-seven 
law students came forward to volunteer. It was so 
impressive that The Daily Record, Maryland's legal 
newspaper, ran a feature story on it. 8 When 
counting the states, the federal circuits, and the 
federal districts, a total of 157 jurisdictions had to be 
examined. Accordingly, with fifty-seven volunteers, 
each student was assigned three jurisdictions. 
The Team for the Brief in Opposjtion 
While the law students went to work, 
assembled the team of those individuals who would 
assist me in the actual crafting of the Brief in 
Opposition. This team consisted of Joe Freeman 
Shankle, Esquire, Deborah N. Abramson, Esquire, 
and Stacy W. McCormack, then a law clerk at my 
wife's firm. Joe, a 1994 University of Baltimore 
School of Law graduate, and Stacy, a 1996 
graduate, were both former students of mine. Joe 
ultimately invested in excess of 300 hours on the 
Wilson appeal. 
The fifty-seven volunteers had one week and 
two weekends to complete the legal research. 
Each volunteer was required to produce a work 
product, consisting of one or more three-inch 3-ring 
"0" binders, for the three assigned jurisdictions, 
containing every opinion published during the 
applicable 19-year period, if there was any 
argument that the case could possibly be a Mimms 
application to a passenger. The student work 
product was due by April 29 -- seven days before 
the start of final exams. After April 29, the student 
volunteers would return to their exam preparation, 
hoping not to have irretrievably harmed their 
semester with a ten-day side trip to the Supreme 
Court. 
While the student volunteers were 
researching, Joe, Stacy, and I began analyzing the 
petitions filed by the State and the amicus. Joe and 
Stacy pulled all of the authority relied on in these 
petitions. I continued to plan the strategy for our 
8 U.B. Students Wet Legal Feet, THE DAILY RECORD, June 12, 1996, 
at 
three issues. Joe began constructing the 
Statement of the Case. He also conducted legal 
research into the applicable secondary authority. In 
addition, Joe began obtaining and analyzing 
government data regarding assaults on law 
enforcement officers during the last twenty years. 
Stacy likewise researched secondary authority. In 
addition, she researched all of the cases in which 
the Court had adopted, or had rejected, a "bright-
line" approach in its Fourth Amendment analysis. 
By April 29, the student volunteers had 
submitted dozens and dozens of binders of case 
authority. The task of analyzing and synthesizing 
this authority, and converting it into a cohesive, 
persuasive Brief in Opposition in only twenty-one 
days seemed nearly impossible. We constructed 
the first argument under the following point heading: 
"The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland is not contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent." 
The point heading for the second argument 
was as follows: "The issue presented in the petition 
has remained largely untouched by the lower 
courts." The final analysis of the case authority on 
this issue supported my supposition. There were 
only sixty-one occasions, in nineteen years -- or 
roughly three times per year throughout the entire 
nation -- in which a published opinion had 
addressed the issue of whether the rule in Mimms 
was intended to apply to passengers. The District 
of Columbia and twenty-seven of the states had not 
had even one occasion to address this issue. 
Moreover, only four of the twelve federal circuits 
and only four of the ninety-five federal districts had 
confronted this issue even once. The small number 
of jurisdictions confronting the issue is probably 
because law enforcement officers, based on their 
training, ordinarily keep all passengers in the 
vehicle. When a validly stopped vehicle contains 
two or more individuals, usually the last thing that 
the law enforcement officer wants is to have them 
outside the vehicle. 
Not only was there minimal need for a "Mimms 
to passenger" rule, there was only a minor split 
among those states that had addressed the issue. 
In Wilson, Maryland had become only the third state 
to expressly hold, on non-independent and 
adequate state grounds, that Mimms does not 
apply to passengers. 
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The information provided by the Department of 
Justice, in its annual Uniform Crime Reports, was 
also revealing. During an eight-year period, there 
were only four law enforcement officers killed by 
passengers, during routine traffic stops, in the 
entire nation. There were an additional seven 
situations in which the assailant was unknown, as 
well as four situations in which the assailant was a 
combination of the driver and the passenger. 
On the bright-line issue, the point heading 
stated: "This issue is not an appropriate issue for 
this Court to adopt a bright-line rule." An analysis 
of the primary and secondary authority on this issue 
appeared to place us in a strong posture on this 
issue. 
On May 20, following a handful of "all-
nighters," we filed the Brief in Opposition to the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. In our judgment, we 
had accomplished everything that could possibly be 
accomplished. Our Brief in Opposition was 
accompanied by our Motion for Leave to Proceed in 
Forma Pauperis with Affidavit of Indigency by 
Respondent's Father. Obtaining in forma pauperis 
status was crucial because, without it, even if I were 
willing to provide pro bono legal services, I would 
still have to absorb hundreds of dollars in printing 
costs. 
The Grant of Certiorari 
On June 17, the Supreme Court granted the 
State's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 9 Even 
though we were the non-moving party on appeal, 
we began work on the Respondent's Brief 
immediately. In light of the State's Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, we did not need the Petitioner's 
Brief to know exactly what the State would be 
arguing. Joe, Deborah, Stacy, and I met to plan our 
strategy for the Respondent's Brief. 
We knew that our posture in the Respondent's 
Brief would have to be different than our posture 
had been in the Brief in Opposition. In the Brief in 
Opposition, our goal had been to persuade the 
Court why, with only eighty-five cases argued that 
year, the Court should not allocate its time and 
effort to an issue with minimal need for resolution. 
Through its grant of the State's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, the Court had already decided that issue 
against us. Now our task would be to convince the 
9116 s. ct. 2521 (1996). 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 7 
Articles 
Court why our side of the merits of the argument 
was the correct side. 
We knew that this task was formidable. First, 
the current Supreme Court grants certiorari much 
more to reverse than it does to affirm, particularly 
when it grants certiorari to the government in 
constitutional criminal procedure issues. Second, 
this Court is quite conservative, i.e., pro-
government, on Bill of Rights issues in criminal 
cases. Third, among Fourth Amendment intrusions, 
Wilson probably represented as de minimis an 
intrusion as any that had come before the Court. 
Fourth, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court's 
closest precedent, a much more liberal Court had 
previously ruled 6-3 in favor of the government. 
The Petitioner's Brief 
The State filed the Petitioner's Brief on August 
1, 1996. It was an excellent brief that made three 
arguments. First, the State argued that the Court, 
in Mimms, had already extended to law 
enforcement officers the authority to require all 
passengers to exit all validly stopped vehicles. 
Second, even if the Court had not previously 
included passengers within its holding in Mimms, it 
should now do so for exactly the same reason that 
it ruled as to drivers, and the government's weighty 
interest in officer safety should be balanced against 
a de minimis Fourth Amendment intrusion. Third, 
the Court should announce a bright-line rule in favor 
of the government. Under a bright-line rule, there 
is no need for a constitutional analysis on a case-
by-case basis because the Court has pre-approved 
a "bright line," meaning that the result will be the 
same for all cases coming within the "line." In 
addition to the State's brief, five amicus briefs were 
filed in support of the State's position. These 
amicus briefs were filed by the United States of 
America, 39 states (filing together in one brief), the 
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, the National 
Association of Police Organizations, Inc., and 
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. 
(which was joined by the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, Inc., the National District 
Attorneys Association, Inc., the National Sheriffs' 
Association, and the Police Law Institute). 
The Respondent's Brief 
Our Brief naturally countered each of the 
State's arguments. The Supreme Court is always 
concerned with the precedential effect of both its 
28.1 U. BaIt. L. F. 8 
holding and its rationale on the myriad of situations 
that may subsequently arise. Around the same 
time that the court of special appeals handed down 
Wilson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland handed 
down a 7-0 decision, in favor of the defendant, in 
State v. Dennis. 10 Wilson was the "make 'em get 
out of the car" case, and Dennis was the "make 'em 
stay in the car" case. Because the State had also 
filed a petition seeking certiorari in Dennis, we 
intended to urge the Court that the State was 
seeking a bright line that would permit law 
enforcement officers to remove any passenger from 
any vehicle, or to demand that any passenger 
remain in any vehicle, all within the unfettered 
discretion of the officer and not subject to judicial 
review. 
If such a rule were fashioned., a Supreme 
Court Justice, as a passenger in a taxi, pulled over 
for speeding in front of the Supreme Court, could 
be required to remain in the cab for up to a half an 
hour if the computer records indicated a problem 
with the taxi driver. Moreover, because the State 
had argued that many states had already applied 
Mimms to passengers, our strategy included the 
argument that there was no evidence that such a 
rule had produced the desired goal of enhanced 
officer safety. 
After a few extensions courteously granted by 
the Court, and after hundreds of hours invested on 
our part, we filed the Respondent's Brief on 
September 11, 1996.11 The point headings 
accompanying our arguments were as follows: 
WHEN A POLICE OFFICER MAKES A LAWFUL 
TRAFFIC STOP, THE AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO 
REQUIRE THE DRIVER TO EXIT THE VEHICLE 
CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY BE EXTENDED 
TO PASSENGERS, WHEN THERE IS NO 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE 
PASSENGER HAS COMMITTED ANY 
10 342 Md. 196,674 A.2d 928 (1996). The Supreme Court remanded 
Dennis back to the. court of appeals, instructing it to reevaluate its 
decision in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the Court held that if the law 
enforcement officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, the intrusion 
was reasonable, regardless of the motives of the officer. On remand, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reached the same result, although 
the previous 7-0 became 6-1. Dennis v. State, 345 Md. 649, 693 A.2d 
1150 (1997). The State again filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
which the Supreme Court denied. 118 S. Ct. 329 (1997). 
11 To obtain a copy of the Respondent's Brief, call Ms. Barbara Jones 
at 410-837-4635. 
WRONGDOING OR POSES ANY THREAT TO 
OFFICER SAFETY, PARTICULARLY WHEN 
SUCH A RULE WOULD INSULATE POLICE 
CONDUCT -- AND MISCONDUCT -- FROM 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
A. Judge Moylan, a nationally recognized Fourth 
Amendment scholar, correctly analyzed this Court's 
decisions in Mimms, Rakas, and Long. He correctly 
ruled that this Court has never permitted the police 
to automatically require a passenger to exit a 
vehicle, merely because the passenger is in a 
vehicle that has been lawfully stopped for a traffic 
violation. 
B. It is unreasonable, under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, for the police to have the per se 
power, as to all passengers, in all vehicles, under 
all circumstances, to demand that the passenger 
exit the vehicle, when there is no reasonable 
suspicion of passenger wrongdoing and no threat to 
officer safety, and the passenger is merely present 
when the driver violates a traffic regulation. 
C. If this Court were to extend Mimms to 
passengers, much of the reasonableness analysis, 
slowly and carefully evolved by this Court since 
Terry, would be overruled. 
D. No Fourth Amendment issue could be less 
appropriate for the adoption of a bright-line rule 
than the issue now before this Court. The State's 
proposed rule would "draw the line" in such a way 
as to extend unfettered discretion to the police, and 
thus insulate police conduct from judicial review. 
Moreover, by applying a bright-line rule in the 
context of the most frequent of all citizen-police 
encounters, this Court would be deeming an almost 
limitless variety of situations to be constitutionally 
indistinguishable. 
E. Because Trooper Hughes was not 
constitutionally entitled to automatically require 
Wilson to exit the vehicle, the evidence seized was 
a fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, the trial 
court correctly ruled that. the evidence must be 
suppressed, and the appellate court correctly 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
United States Attorney General 
Janet Reno 
During her first three and one-half years in 
office, Attorney General Janet Reno had not argued 
a case before the Court. In the summer of 1996, 
with the presidential election ·only three months 
Articles 
away, there was speculation that, even if President 
Clinton were re-elected, Ms. Reno may not be part 
of the second-term Cabinet. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if Attorney General Reno were seeking 
an opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court. 
Naturally, if the Attorney General of the United 
States argues a case -- any case -- in the Supreme 
Court, that fact alone will give the case a much 
higher profile in the media than it otherwise would 
have. Accordingly, it would be important to select 
an "appropriate" case. Mary/and v. Wilson was the 
perfect case for three reasons. First, by way of 
background, Ms. Reno was a career prosecutor, so 
the ideal case for her to argue would be a criminal 
case. Second, because lay persons would pay 
attention to the case as a result of the Attorney 
General's participation, the ideal case would 
present an issue with which the average man on 
the street could identify. Virtually everyone is, at 
some time, a passenger in a vehicle. Third, 
because of the high profile of the case, it would be 
important for the administration to select a case that 
the government "could not lose." On August 15, 
1996, the United States, having previously filed an 
amicus brief in Wi/son, filed a motion requesting ten 
minutes of the thirty minutes of oral argument time 
allocated to the State of Maryland. The State filed 
an answer, in which it did not oppose the federal 
government's motion, and the Court granted the 
motion.12 Thus, as I began to contemplate my 
thirty-minute oral argument before the Supreme 
Court, scheduled for December 11, 1996, I knew 
that not only would I be arguing against the 
Attorney General of Maryland, I would also be 
arguing against the Attorney General of the United 
States. For me personally, it was simply more good 
luck. As the notoriety of the case increased, so did 
the level of enthusiasm and encouragement from 
both my students and my colleagues. 
I was also very excited for my law school. I am 
very loyal to my alma mater. Understandably, I felt 
proud to be able to a part of the process that 
brought national attention to the University of 
Baltimore School of Law. The media was taking 
note that an upcoming Supreme Court case would 
be argued by the Attorney General of the United 
States and two graduates of the University of 
12117 s. CI. 34 (1996). 
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Baltimore School of Law, one of whom was the 
State Attorney General and one of whom was on its 
faculty. 
The Oral Argument 
The Supreme Court has made an audiotape 
of all oral arguments since 1955. The Earl Warren 
Project has created a six-cassette tape series of 
portions of the oral argument in eighteen landmark 
Supreme Court cases. I listened to these tapes in 
the morning while I jogged. To better prepare me, 
Stacy McCormack created a chart of every case 
(Supreme Court and otherwise) cited in any of the 
briefs, to include the holding, the rationale, and the 
facts. For Supreme Court cases, the chart included 
the vote of every currently sitting justice, if 
applicable, as well as whether that justice authored 
or joined the opinion of the Court, a concurring 
opinion, and/or a dissenting opinion. 
During the two weeks before the oral 
argument, I presented eleven practice arguments 
before two-person or three-person panels. 13 I 
requested each panel to be "hot," meaning a lot of 
questions -- policy questions, questions relating to 
the facts, holding, and rationale of prior deCisions, 
questions relating to the record in this case, 
questions on "what if' as to a myriad of scenarios 
both normal and strange. 
At exactly 10:00 a.m. on December 11, 1996, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist called for oral argument in 
the case of Mary/and v. Wilson, and· Maryland 
Attorney General Joe Curran approached the 
lectern. Joe had allocated fifteen minutes for his 
argument, ten minutes for Ms. Reno's argument, 
and five minutes for rebuttal. The bench was "very 
hot," and the Court had all three of the advocates 
"on the ropes" for the next sixty minutes. I argued 
without notes. Not only did I know my argument, I 
was sure that the Court would be so active in its 
questioning that notes would be of no value. This 
would be -- and in fact was -- a rigorous dialogue 
and not a monologue. After the argument, when 
reflecting on which justices had asked which 
questions, I counted twenty-two questions that I 
fielded during thirty minutes of argument. 
13 I will always be grateful to those individuals who "mooted" me during 
one or more of my eleven practice arguments. They included judges, 
professors, attorneys, and former students. 
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What I did not appreciate, until I stood at the 
lectern, is that the advocate is only about ten feet 
from the Chief Justice. Not only is the bench long, 
with four justices spread out on either side, the 
bench is bowed, such that Justice Ginsberg and 
Justice Breyer, each of whom is on one of the 
extreme ends as a junior justice, are about three 
feet in front of the Chief Justice. To be able to see 
all nine justices at one time, an advocate would 
have to be about another ten feet further back. 
Early in my argument, I had a trilogy of questions 
from Justice Kennedy (two justices to my right), 
Justice Breyer (four justices to my right), and 
Justice Souter (three justices to my left), which 
required me to keep turning from side to side. The 
justices and I entered into a fast paced interchange 
that continued, unabated, for thirty minutes. 
I assumed that I would be nervous, but I was 
not. I did my best to follow the advice of the late 
Justice William Brennan, who suggested that 
counsel come before the Court to explain their 
doctoral thesis, and not come to fight with the 
Court. For twenty-one years, I have been 
explaining principles of law, their rationale, and the 
subtle nuances in their application. That is exactly 
what I tried to do on December 11, 1996. 
After the oral argument, Attorney General 
Reno was gracious in her remarks to me and 
generous with her time, as she joined Joe Curran 
and me for pictures taken by the Law School 
photographer. Her presence gave the case a high 
profile, resulting in my participation in numerous 
national television and radio forums, including CNN 
"Crossfire," "Geraldo Rivera Live," "Cochran & 
Company," and MSNBC. 
Knowing the law, and understanding the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the current 
Court, I had no illusion of prevailing on the merits of 
the case. When the Court handed down its 7-2 
opinion in favor of the State, on February 19, 1997, 
I was not surprised. I did rationalize a pyrrhic 
victory in two ways. First, Justice Kennedy, who is 
usually pro-government on Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure issues, wrote a dissent on the 
defense side of the case. Second, the Court gave 
the State less of a bright line rule than it requested. 
Although the Court did extend to law enforcement 
officers the per se authority to make all passengers 
exit all vehicles, the Court declined to reach the 
issue of whether law enforcement officers have per 
se authority to make all passengers remain in all 
vehicles. Although the advocate in me fought hard 
for a different result in Wilson, the citizen in me is 
not uncomfortable with the law that resulted from 
the Court's ruling. 
Conclusion 
I find now that whenever I sit as a visitor in the 
Supreme Court, I relive those wonderful memories 
of that one moment in time when the answers were 
all up to me. Our system of government is founded 
on the rule of law. Since Marbury v. Madison, 14 the 
Supreme Court has been the ultimate authority 
under our separation of powers doctrine. Decisions 
such as Brown v. Board of Education, 15 Gideon v. 
Wainwright,16 Roe v. Wade,17 United States v. 
Nixon,18 Jones v. Clinton,19 and others prove the 
point., To have been a small part of that legacy is 
an awesome thought and an experience for which 
I will always be grateful. 
14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
17 410 U.s. 113 (1973). 
18 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
19 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997). 
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